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Abstract 
 
In this study we investigate the effect of payment method used in 108 acquisitions made between 
2010 and 2012 with a publicly listed Swedish firm as the bidder. We also control for deal-specific 
characteristics such as the home country of the target firm and the value of the acquisition. We apply 
a standard event study methodology to find abnormal returns around the announcement day and our 
findings show positive short term returns for bidding firms, especially when the payment is 
comprised at least partially of stock. However, when controlling for payment method by the location 
of the target firm we find the market favors stock financing only in cross-border acquisitions. 
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1.Introduction 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are complex strategic events for the acquiring firm. In this paper we look at 
how the payment method affects the shareholder value on a short term basis. Several studies have 
been conducted on the subject in the past, but to our current knowledge, none have been made with 
a dataset of Swedish acquiring firms. Most studies are made from an American or European 
perspective and since stock prices in part are subject to local investor’s estimations, the cultural 
differences and corporate governance climate in the bidding firms’ home country could generate 
different results when measuring whether cash or stock is regarded as the better option by investors. 
Compared to the larger markets in the US, UK and France, the Swedish M&A market is 
characterised by relatively larger acquisitions and a more concentrated ownership much like the 
Canadian market. There are several large groups that control many of the most prominent Swedish 
companies, such as the Wallenberg family with their investment company Investor and the 
Handelsbanken-group with their investment company Industrivärden.  
The literature offers several contradicting perspectives on the subject of payment method in mergers 
and acquisitions. For example: Fullers, Netters and Stegemollers (2002) research, among others, 
argue that stock financing could be viewed less as favourable than cash financing deal due to 
information asymmetry and valuation uncertainty. Others, however, argue in favour of the stock 
financed deals due to ‘monitoring by existing shareholder of the target firm’ (Kang & Kim, 2008). 
Since studies are made on different markets the arguments differ about which payment method is the 
most preferable. Our ambition is to examine what arguments that are the strongest and most valid on 
the Swedish market.  
 
Our study focuses on the impact on short term shareholder value depending on the payment method 
used in both domestic and cross-border acquisitions. Shareholder value is defined as the return on 
the stock and is investigated using the standard event study approach presented by MacKinley (1997). 
We investigate the abnormal returns around the announcement day to figure out whether the 
payment method used has any effect on the return after controlling for the location of the target firm 
and a few other deal-specific characteristics. Before we started we expected results similar to those in 
the Dutta’s, Zaadi’s and Zhu’s (2013) and Eckbo’s and Thornburn (1999) Canadian studies in which 
they found significantly positive effects on the short term shareholder value given the same 
definition. Their results did in part opposed those made on larger markets such as the US (Moeller & 
Schlingemann, 2005) and European (Faccio & Masulis, 2005) in which they found none or negative 
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effects of the announcement. Our study finds that Swedish firm’s acquisitions tend to generate 
significant and positive returns around the announcement day that cannot be explained with only 
normal market fluctuations. The announcement has a significantly positive effect on the shareholder 
value that is explained by the market quickly adjusting to the news that their firm intends to expand 
through merger or acquisition. More than that, we find that when looking only at the cross-border 
acquisitions, there seems to be a clear tendency for the market to react more positively to those deals 
comprised of at least part stock rather than those where the payment is only cash financed. When the 
target firm is based in Sweden we find no difference between payment methods. 
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2. Literature review and theory 
2.1. Nature of acquisitions and assumptions on market efficiency 
 
There are two main ways for a company to grow - organic and inorganic. Inorganic growth means 
that the company grows through mergers, acquisitions or take-overs and is what this study focuses 
on. This is a fast way for companies to expand their operations as well as balance sheets. It is also an 
easy way to reach new markets but with it comes great risk and each proposition must be evaluated 
carefully before being undertaken. Although the synergies are calculated carefully it sometimes 
doesn’t work out the way that was expected. Another risk is the so called agency problems. An 
acquisition can be a good project in the view of the managers, but not in the view of the 
shareholders, as argued by Jensen (1986). Conflicts arise when firms have a large free cash flow and 
instead of paying dividends the managers could have incentives to spend the cash on acquisitions 
that doesn’t maximize the shareholders’ value and instead invest to maximize financial ratios which 
could be tied to the managements’ bonuses. For example de Jong, DeJong, Mertens and 
Roosenboom (2005) found that the managers of Royal Dutch Ahold did not act in the interest of the 
shareholders when they bought competitors, but rather to serve interest of the managers themselves. 
They kept the share price high in the short term but it all ended with a disaster in the long term, since 
the acquisitions were made without a long term strategic plan. It is important to remember that an 
acquisition is not per definition value creating.  Especially on short term an acquisition does not 
necessarily increase value (expected synergies might grow with time). 
We do not hold a discussion concerning whether the market is efficient or not because that would be 
a thesis by itself. However we do believe it is important to conclude that in this report we assume full 
market efficiency and that it incorporates and captures the different aspects (announcements) in the 
correct way.  
The location of the target company is one of the transaction characteristics that have been previously 
proven to affect returns. Empirical evidence is neither in favour of domestic or foreign acquisitions 
and the theories behind the sometimes opposing results is mostly related to acquirer’s home country 
and the cultural and legal environment. Dutta, Saadi and Zhu (2013) argues that due to the M&A 
market being characterized by relatively larger transactions, a higher concentration of ownership and 
a lack of strict anti-takeover regulations in some countries, such as Canada, they find that cross-
border generally seem to be regarded as more favourable than domestic acquisitions. On the other 
hand, Moeller & Schlingemann, (2005) look at the US market and find insignificant differences 
between domestic and cross-border acquisitions.  
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Cross-border acquisitions are naturally the more exotic alternative and there are a number of reasons 
why they could be preferable. Primarily, they pose an opportunity for the acquiring company to get 
access to an expanded investment opportunity set (Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005). This would be 
beneficial not only due the expected higher return on their investment that naturally follows an 
increase in the number of investment options, but it increases the likelihood that the optimal synergy 
effects and efficiency gains of the acquisitions will be realized. 
From a corporate government perspective, the acquiring countries legal environment is of great 
importance. Not only might the acquisition change the policies in the target firm and expectation of 
future dividends among their current shareholders, Bris, Brisley and Cabolis (2008) argues that the 
level of shareholder protection might be different between the two countries. If the target company 
comes from a country with a better shareholder protection and better accounting standards, the 
performance of the combined firms are likely to improve. 
Cross-border acquisitions do not come without posing some challenges though. Factors that may 
induce negative expectations on the future wealth of shareholders are integration problems with both 
managerial and regulatory assets (Campa & Hernando 2006). Other problems that could arise range 
from agency-problems to a loss of synergy and efficiency gains following a lack of sufficient attention 
to the integration process. 
So since acquisition do not automatically increase shareholder value for the bidding firms, our first 
hypothesis therefore tests for the short term gains in our sample of Swedish firms: 
Hypothesis 1. Announcements of a merger or an acquisition tend to increase short term shareholder 
value for the bidding firm. 
 
2.2. Cash versus stock as payment method 
 
Fuller, Netter & Stegemoller (2002) argues that since there is a level of information asymmetry and 
therefore uncertainty regarding the valuation of stock, each firm will naturally have a better 
understanding of whether their own stock is over- or undervalued. This has the effect that the 
acquiring firm might be more or less eager to use stock as a payment measure depending on their 
current situation. If their stock is over-valued by the market they would gain more by offering stock 
and if it is under-valued they would lose. The target firm, in turn, might be unsure about the actual 
value of the stock they are being paid with and might prefer cash for this reason. And if the acquirer 
is unsure about the target firm’s value, they might not want to offer cash at all since the target firm 
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would only accept an offer equal or greater to their true value. If the target firm has a concentrated 
distribution of ownership or if the acquirer for any other reason is worried about retaining control 
over the newly acquired firm they might prefer to buy out existing shareholders using cash instead of 
stock (Faccio & Masulis, 2005). 
Empirical studies show that cash is the preferred payment method in most cases. However this is to 
the best of our knowledge not yet tested on an all Swedish sample and the only study to include data 
on Swedish firms is Faccio & Masulis (2005), who examine a sample of 3667 observations of 
European acquisitions, including 197 in which the acquiring firm is Swedish. They find that cash is 
the preferred method when the bidders controlling shareholder has an intermediate level of voting 
power in the range of 20-60%, and therefore risk losing control if not buying out the target firm’s 
current shareholders. Our test for differences in average cumulative abnormal returns between the 
payment methods: 
Hypothesis 2.  The payment method used in the acquisition has an effect on the on short term 
shareholder value. 
 
2.3. Cash versus stock as payment method in cross-border acquisitions 
 
Cross-border acquisitions are in nature often more complex than those of a local firm. Faccio & 
Masulis (2002) opts for cash as the preferred method of payment due to reasons previously 
mentioned, and due to investors having a so called “home country bias’, in their portfolio 
investments because the target firm’s investors usually are local and tend to view foreign stocks as 
more risky and their valuation as more uncertain. Kang & Kim (2008) argues for the importance of 
having local shareholders monitoring the activities of the newly acquired firm and therefore support 
the use of stock as payment. If the payment method is purely cash this will eliminate the current 
shareholders and might therefore affect the estimated future wealth of the new shareholders 
negatively. Local investors also have access to soft information that might otherwise be hard to 
obtain and could have a major impact on the stock valuation. Another aspect the target firms’ 
shareholders must consider when facing an offer is the taxes. In case of a cash payment taxes must 
be paid directly. When getting paid by stock one might, depending on that country’s tax regulations, 
get a lower tax rate, or wait to sell until a more preferable day (Fuller, Netter & Stegemoller, 2002). 
Empirical evidence on the matter is inconclusive and the support for the hypothesis that stock is 
regarded as more favourable than cash seem to in large depend on the acquiring firm’s home 
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country. Most studies using a dataset from one of the more competitive markets, such as the US 
(Huang & Walkling, 1987; Moeller & Schlingenmann, 2005) and the UK (Faccio & Masulis, 2002; 
Franks, Harris & Mayer, 1988), finds results in favour of cash or results not in favour of either 
payment method. The Canadian studies (Dutta, Saadi & Zhu, 2013; Eckbo & Thornbur 2000) show 
results which we expect to be similar to those in our study on an all Swedish sample. We test for the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3 Stock financing in cross-border acquisitions is more preferable than cash financing in 
cross-border acquisitions. 
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3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
 
This study considers all mergers and acquisitions that occurred between 2010 and 2012 and involved 
a publicly listed Swedish company as the acquiring firm. The dataset was obtained from the Zephyr 
database on mergers and acquisitions. A list was compiled of all acquisition meeting the following 
criteria: (i) the deals were completed, (ii) the deals were announced between 2010 and 2012, (iii) the 
payment method is either stock, cash or a mix of both, (iv) the acquirer is a publicly listed firm, (v) 
the acquirer has not announced a previous acquisition within the last 126 trading days from the 
current. The sample consist of 110 observations, all of which include the deal specific characteristics 
of total deal value (including estimates), the payment method used, target firm home country and the 
date of the announcement. 
Stock return data were collected from the Bloomberg database and observations in which the 
acquiring company lack historical closing prices for 120 trading days before announcement 
acquisition were removed, leaving a final sample of 108 observations. Accounting information, 
(market capitalization) are also obtained from the Bloomberg. The sample set up and descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 1 and 2.  
 
Table 1 
Yearly distribution of sample (n = 108) of acquisitions involving publicly listed Swedish firms as the bidder. The sample is divided on 
basis of the target company being ‘domestic’ (Swedish firm acquiring another Swedish firm) or ‘foreign’ (Swedish firm acquiring a 
foreign firm). The sample is selected based on several criteria: (i) the deals were completed, (ii) the deals were announced between 2010 
and 2012, (iii) the payment method is either stock, cash or a mix of both, (iv) the acquirer is a publicly listed firm, (v) the acquirer has 
not announced a previous acquisition within the last nine month of the current. All values are in MSEK. 
Year 
Number of 
Transactions 
Number of Domestic 
Targets 
Number of Foreign 
Targets 
Total           
Transaction Value 
Average             
Transaction Value 
2012 31 14 17 14 472.6 466.9 
2011 40 15 25 44 274.1 1 106.9 
2010 37 19 18 24 790.5 670.0 
Total 108 48 60 83 537.3 773.5 
 
As we can see we have 48 respectively 60 observations for domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions. Total number of observations by year is similar every year (31, 40 and 37). The total 
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transaction value, however, is remarkably higher in 2011 than in 2012 (44 274 MSEK and 14 477 
MSEK, respectively). One possible explanation could be the current economic situation in the 
world, but this will not be examined further. The main difference between our sample and those 
used in previous studies is the size and the market which is examined. Most studies uses samples 
in the range of thousands observations and are made on either one single large market or several 
smaller.  
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
3.2.1. Abnormal returns around the announcement dates. 
 
We apply MacKinlays (1997) event study methodology to calculate the effect on stock prices around 
the initial announcement. An increase in stock prices relates to an increase in short term shareholder 
value since we define it as return on the stock. We use a one factor model called the ‘market model’ 
to find abnormal returns. This model accounts for variation in the market and thereby eliminating a 
potential bias in the returns related to changes in the market not directly related to the acquiring firm 
or the acquisition. This should lead to a decreased variance and hopefully a better chance to detect 
the real effect of the announcement. The gains from using a multifactor model, such as one which 
also account for industry variations, are found to be limited due to the marginal explanatory power in 
additional factors.   The expected returns are calculated as: 
 (    )   ̂   ̂         (1) 
Where      is the return on the market for the given time. The security specific parameters  ̂  
and  ̂  are calculated using an estimation window from       to      in relation to the 
announcement day of the acquisition    . The 30 day interval between      to    is excluded to 
avoid including information about the event that may affect returns, such as rumours. 
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Figure 1 
Time series diagram over estimation               and event window          used to find abnormal returns and cumulative 
abnormal returns using stock return data for individual acquiring firms with the announcement day as the event day     .
 
 
The expected return is then used to find abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns. We 
express abnormal returns as: 
            (    )    (2) 
Where    and  (    ) are the observed return and the expected value on stock i on the day   from 
the announcement day.  
 
3.2.2. Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
We calculate cumulative abnormal returns by summarising all abnormal return in the four different 
event windows, ranging from 5 days before to 5 days after announcement. They are defined 
as                                               .  
The event windows are chosen in order to capture different effects in the market with respect to 
information availability. They are also consistent with a previous study in the same area (Dutta, Saadi 
& Zhu, 2013) 
            ∑      
 
                                                       (3) 
The sample average cumulative abnormal return is then calculated by summarizing the average 
abnormal returns 
 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         ∑   
̅̅ ̅̅
 
 
                                                         (4) 
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In practice,    
  is unknown and we therefore approximate the variance of the average cumulative 
abnormal returns using the average variance of the individual firms’ abnormal returns. 
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         
 
  
∑        
  
                                                (5) 
A t-test is used to examine the significance of the cumulative abnormal returns. 
  
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅       
√       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        
                                                        (6) 
To test for differences between groups ‘1’ & ‘2’ we also use a t-test. 
  
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        
√   (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        )    (   
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        )
                                               (7) 
 
 
3.2.3. Deal-specific characteristics  
As we can see in Table 2, there exist clear tendencies to use cash to finance the acquisitions (59% of 
deals are finance by pure cash while only 10% are financed by pure stock). The groups that we 
compare are arranged depending on the home country of the target firm and the payment method 
used in the transaction. The location variables are called “cross-border” (target firm is based in foreign 
country) and “domestic” (target firm is based in Sweden). The first payment method variable is called 
“cash” (payment consists of only cash but may have been paid over time or on a performance basis). 
The second is a pooled variable of all observations using at least part stock to finance the acquisition 
called ‘stock and mixed’. This is done since the data consists of only a small number of pure ‘stock’ 
based transactions (only 11 observations financed fully by stock and which were eligible for the study 
is included in our sample). The pooled variable enables us to find a more significant difference 
between the cash based observations and the rest due to a higher number of observations in 
respective group.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of deal-specific variables for acquiring firms. The sample consists of 108 acquisitions made by publicly listed 
Swedish firms between the years 2010 to 2013. “Deal Value” is the total transaction value in SEK. “Method of Payment” is a 
categorical variable dividing the sample into those where the transaction is funded by purely ‘cash’, ‘stock’ or a ‘mix’ of them both. 
“Domestic/Cross-Border” is a dummy variable representing whether the target firm is based in Sweden or in a foreign country, and 
below that you find the payment method used depending on the location of the target firm. “Relative Size” is the ‘deal value’ divided 
by the market capitalization on announcement day. 
  
Number Percentage 
Deal Value Less than 10m 16 15% 
 
10 to 100 m 39 36% 
 
100 to 500 m 27 25% 
 
More than 500 m 27 25% 
Method of Payment Cash 64 59% 
 
Stock 11 10% 
 
Mix 34 31% 
Domestic/Cross-Border Domestic 49 45% 
 
Cross-border 60 55% 
Cross-Border and Payment Method Cash 41 68% 
 
Stock 5 8% 
 
Mix 14 23% 
Domestic and Payment Method Cash 23 47% 
 
Stock 6 12% 
 
Mix 20 41% 
Relative Size Less than 5% 43 39% 
 
5 to 25% 42 39% 
 
More than 25% 24 22% 
Market capitalization Less than 100m 17 16% 
 
100-500m 23 21% 
 
500-1000m 8 7% 
 
1000-5000m 27 25% 
 
More than 5000m 33 31% 
 
 
3.2.4 Regressions 
 
To further investigate whether payment method has an effect on the short-term shareholder value we 
perform an ordinary least squares multivariate regression analysis. We use two different models to 
capture different effects. Model (8) captures the effect of payment method Shares and Mix.  The 
following regression model is used: 
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                                      (8) 
The dependent variable in the regression is the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (of the acquiring 
Swedish firms). 
The independent variable of interest is’ SharesMix’,  a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the deal is 
financed with either pure stock or a mixture between stock and cash, and zero otherwise. Hence the 
estimate of    will capture the effect of the financing method on cumulative abnormal return.  
We also include a dummy variable for where the target firm is located. The value is equal to 1 if the 
target firm is non-Swedish and zero otherwise. Hence    measures the effect on cumulative 
abnormal return depending on where the target firm is located. 
We also include a set of other control variables that measure other deal characteristics: 
(i) ‘Foreign Target’ is a dummy variable equal to 1 of the target company is located in another country 
than Sweden. 
(ii) ‘Relative size’ (ratio between the transaction value and the acquiring firm’s market value). The 
relative size is transformed into a logarithmic value to normalize the data. 
(iii)‘Market Cap.’ of the bidder, which is also in logarithmic form.  
Figure 5 and 6 in the appendix shows the distribution of the variables (i) and (ii) before and after the 
transformation into a logarithmic value. 
With the first regression model we investigate the following hypothesis (which corresponds to the 
second hypothesis stated in the previous sections): 
 
        or ‘Payment method has no effect on cumulative abnormal returns’.  
     ≠ 0 or ‘Payment method has an effect on cumulative abnormal returns’. 
 
Model (9) includes the interaction term (     ‘Foreign*SharesMix’. The following regression 
model is used: 
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                                                            (9) 
 
The interaction term ‘Foreign*SharesMix’ represents all the foreign targets that are paid with either mix 
or shares. It is included to see if payment method matters for bidders who acquire a foreign target. 
Hence    will give us the effect on cumulative abnormal return depending on where the target is 
located and how the deal is financed. The other independent variables used in Model (8) are kept in 
Model (9).  
 
With the second regression model we investigate the following hypothesis (which corresponds to the 
third hypothesis stated in the previous sections): 
 
         or ‘Stock and mixed financed deal has none, or a negative effect on  cumulative 
abnormal returns’ 
        or ‘Stock and mixed financed deals has a positive effect on cumulative abnormal 
returns for cross-border acquisitions’ 
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4. Empirical results and discussion 
 
4.1 Value creation for acquiring firms: the short-run evidence 
 
Table 3 summarizes the sample average cumulative abnormal returns for all event windows 
(           ,      and        and for different groupings (‘domestic’ & ‘cross-border’). We find that 
the cumulative abnormal returns are highly significant and positive across all four event windows. 
The results show support for hypothesis 1; “Announcements of a merger or an acquisition tend to increase short 
term shareholder value for the bidding firm” and is consistent with the findings in a recent study on 
Canadian M&A (Dutta, Saadi & Zhu, 2013). These results do however oppose those of studies made 
on larger markets, such as the US, UK or European, where cumulative abnormal returns for the 
acquiring firms are insignificant or negative around announcement day. We believe the reason for 
this to be a combination of the relatively larger deal values and a more concentrated ownership of the 
bidding firm that we find in the all Swedish sample. It is also possible that, since Sweden is a rather 
small but active market, firms here are forced to be more internationally active then those acting on 
larger markets. Therefore the home country bias might be a bit weakened compare to, for example, 
in the US, which might explain part of the higher cumulative abnormal returns for the acquirers.  
 
Table 3 
Cumulative abnormal returns for all eligible M&A events in the sample (n=108). Four event windows analysed and tested using t-
statistics. Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% is denoted with *, ** and ***. 
Event window (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (0, +2) (-5, +5) 
     
   Avg. CAR 0,0359*** 0,0400*** 0,0377*** 0,0368*** 
   T-stat 5,7600 7,4492 5,8474 8,6397 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The average cumulative abnormal returns for           follow the expected distribution presented 
in Brown & Warner’s (1985) event study paper. Figure 2 shows how the average cumulative 
abnormal returns are about zero the days before the event since no new information have reached 
the market. Around the announcement date the market quickly reacts and we can see the effect of 
the event. In a perfect market this should happen immediately and the entire effect should be 
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captured in          However on average we find significant abnormal returns for the 
period       . After this period the security returns once again stabilise.  
 
Figure 1 
The average cumulative abnormal returns of all securities in the sample (n = 108) spanning from      to    trading days with the event 
day (day of the announcement of acquisition as   ). 
 
 
Table 4 reports the cumulative abnormal returns according to payment method. For pure cash 
financed deals, acquiring shareholders earn a positive and significant cumulative abnormal return of 
approximately 2.4%. For pure stock and mixed financed acquisitions, the cumulative abnormal 
returns are also positive and significant at on average 5.3%. The difference between the magnitude of 
the cumulative abnormal returns for all event windows are both significant and in favour of ‘stock and 
mixed’ financed deals, which supports hypothesis 2; “The payment method used in the acquisition has an effect 
on the on short term shareholder value”. It is important to remember that this test doesn’t include any deal-
specific variables other than payment method and the results might be due to other factors not 
included in this test. These results are not consistent with previous studies, in which they find no 
significant difference in cumulative abnormal returns for payment method without first grouping the 
acquisitions depending on the location of the target firm (Dutta, Saadi & Zhu, 2013; Eckbo & 
Thorburn, 2000). 
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Table 4 
Cumulative abnormal returns by payment method for all eligible M&A events in the sample (n=108). The payment methods are ‘cash’ 
(financed fully by cash) and ‘stock & mix’ (financed in part or in full by stock). Four event windows were analysed and tested using t-
statistics. Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% is denoted with *, ** and ***. 
Event window (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (0, +2) (-5, +5) 
         
1. Cash (N = 63) 
       Avg. CAR 0,0237*** 0,0274*** 0,0204*** 0,0280*** 
   T-stat 5,9211 7,8081 5,1462 8,8375 
2. Stock & Mix (N = 45) 
       Avg.CAR 0,0530*** 0,0576*** 0,0619*** 0,0491*** 
   T-stat 3,8226 4,8357 4,2822 5,3332 
 
 
 
3. Comparison 
       Mean difference (2 – 1) 0,0293** 0,0302** 0,0415*** 0,0211** 
   T-stat 2,1303 2,4321 2,7688 2,1671 
 
Table 5 reports the cumulative abnormal return according to payment method for the groups 
‘domestic’ and ‘cross-border’. For both ‘cash’ and ‘shares and mixed’ financed deals, the cumulative 
abnormal returns are significant and positive at approximately between 3% and 4% depending on the 
event window. The differences between the groups are, however, almost non-existing. These results 
also differ from the studies mentioned above, in which they find significant differences for the 
cumulative abnormal returns in favour of the cross-border deals. 
 
Table 5 
Cumulative abnormal returns by target firm location for all eligible M&A events in the sample (n=108). The location variables are 
‘domestic’ (target firm located in Sweden) and ‘cross-border’ (target firm located outside Sweden). Four event windows were analysed and 
tested using t-statistics. Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% is denoted with *, ** and ***. 
Event window (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (0, +2) (-5, +5) 
          
  1. Domestic (N = 48) 
       Avg. CAR 0,0339*** 0,0397*** 0,0352*** 0,4054*** 
   T-stat 5,4715 6,9199 6,0965 7,1988 
2. Cross-Border (N = 60) 
       Avg.CAR 0,0375*** 0,0402*** 0,0397*** 0,0338*** 
   T-stat 3,7271 4,7272 3,7261 5,4483 
3. Comparison 
       Mean difference (2 – 1) 0,0036 0,0005 0,0045 -0,0068 
   T-stat 0,3032 0,0456 0,3714 -0,8065 
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Table 6 reports the effect of the payment method in the respective groups ‘domestic’ and ‘cross-border’. 
For the domestic deals we see significant and positive results at approximately 2.7% to 4.7% for all 
event windows and for both payment methods. The difference between them is almost non-existing 
so we conclude that the payment method has no effect on cumulative abnormal return when looking 
at only domestic acquisitions. A graph of the cumulative abnormal returns for           is found in 
figure 3. For cross-border deals however, we find that even though both payment methods yields 
significant and positive cumulative abnormal returns, the deals financed with at least part stock is 
highly favoured over the deals composed of pure cash (7.7% cumulative abnormal returns compared 
to 1.8%) As you can see in figure 4 the ‘stock or mixed’ financed deals greatly surpass the cash only 
deals. The mean difference is significant in all event windows.  
 
Table 6 
Cumulative abnormal returns by payment method for each group ‘domestic’ (target firm was located in Sweden) and ‘cross-border’ (target 
firm was located outside of Sweden). Four event windows were analysed and tested using t-statistics. Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% is denoted with *, ** and ***. 
Event windows (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (0, +2) (-5, +5) 
                  Panel A. Cumulative abnormal returns by payment method for all domestic M&A events 
   1. Domestic cash financed deals (N = 23) 
    
 
Avg.CAR 0.0340*** 0.0391*** 0.0267*** 0.0467*** 
 
T-stat 3,9830 5,3348 3,3443 
 
7,0925 
2. Domestic stock & mix financed deals (N = 25) 
    
 
Avg.CAR 0.0338*** 0.0403*** 0.0431*** 0.0348*** 
 
T-stat 3,7828 4,6268 5,1907 3,8917 
3. Comparison 
    
 
Mean difference (2 – 1) -0.0001 0.0012 0.0164 -0.0119 
 
T-stat -0,0087 0,105824 1,4260 -1,0716 
      Panel B. Cumulative abnormal returns by payment method for all cross-border M&A events 
  1. Cross-border cash financed deals (N = 40) 
    
 
Avg.CAR 0.0177*** 0.0207*** 0.0169*** 0.0173*** 
 
T-stat 4,4842 5,7807 6,9820 5,3070 
2. Cross-border stock & mix financed deals (N = 20)     
 
Avg.CAR 0.0770*** 0.0793*** 0.0855*** 0.0669*** 
 
T-stat 2,6424 3,2365 2,7731 3,8337 
3. Comparison 
    
 
Mean difference (2 – 1) 0.0592* 0.0586** 0.0686** 0.0338** 
 
T-stat 2,0149 2,3673 2,2057 2,7963 
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Figure 2 
The average cumulative abnormal returns of all domestic acquisitions in the sample, grouped by payment method ‘cash’ (n = 23) and 
‘shares & mix’ (n = 25) spanning from      to    trading days with the event day (day of the announcement of acquisition as   ). The 
average for the entire sample is including for purpose of comparison. 
 
 
Figure 3 
The average cumulative abnormal returns of all cross-border acquisitions in the sample, grouped by payment method ‘cash’ ( n = 40) 
and ‘shares & mix’ (n = 20) spanning from      to    trading days with the event day (day of the announcement of acquisition as   ). 
The average for the entire sample is including for purpose of comparison. 
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Our findings indicate that there is no difference in cumulative abnormal returns between using pure 
cash and ‘stock or mixed’ when looking at acquisitions of domestic targets. Hypothesis 3 states that 
“Stock financing in cross-border acquisitions is more preferable than cash financing in cross-border acquisitions” and 
for three of the cumulative abnormal returns we find a significant difference in favour of stock and 
mixed financed deals. Our results are consistent with Dutta’s, Saadi’s and Zhu’s (2013) Canadian 
study, which shows that the market tends to react more positively to stock financed cross-border 
acquisitions than cash financed. However, they are not supporting studies on the US market, in 
which the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement date are negative or 
insignificant.  A possible explanation for this might be that the Canadian and the Swedish M&A 
market have similar characteristics which differ from the US, such as the lack of strict anti-takeover 
regulations, larger relative values of acquisitions and a higher propensity to pay with cash, which 
might help generate a higher cumulative abnormal returns (Eckbo & Thorburn, 2000; Faccio & 
Masulis, 2005). 
 
It is also interesting to note the average cumulative abnormal returns for the cash financed deals are 
lower for cross-border acquisitions than they are for domestic. As shown in panel C that when 
payment method is not considered the returns are almost identical. Possibly, using a larger sample 
size or doing an in depth study of the characteristics of the Swedish M&A market might yield an 
explanation for the our findings, which oppose those of Franks, Harris & Mayer (1988) and Eckbo & 
Langohr (1989) whose results are all in favour of cash financed deals but were conducted on the US, 
UK and French market. The samples in these studies are not up to date and the latest observation 
used is from 1985 so it is reasonable to assume the market characteristics might have change since 
then and therefore they might not be suitable to direct comparison with our findings. 
 
4.2 Analysis of deal-specific characteristics  
 
To test for deal-specific variables that might not be captured in the previous t-tests (performed in 
section 4.1), we perform a regression analysis. The results from the OLS regressions are presented in 
Table 4. OLS regression with robust standard errors can be found in the appendix (Table 6). 
The event window used in this regression is         . This particular event window is picked 
because we believe that it the most interesting from a research perspective. It has in previous 
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studies shown the most significant results and will therefore be used by us for comparability 
purposes. Regressions with the other three event windows can be found in the appendix. 
 
Table 4 
CAR measures the Cumulative Abnormal Return around the announcement day of an acquisition.. The below presented table shows 
how different variables effect the dependent variable CAR1 (of the bidding firm).  An OLS-regression is used to obtain the results. 
SharesMix is a dummy variables for payment method. If the payment method is shares or mix the value is 1 and otherwise (Cash) 0.  
Cross-border target is also a dummy variable for whether the target firm is domestic or cross-border. Cross-border target*SharesMix is 
an interaction term to capture the specific effect of payment method on foreign targets. Relative size is the logarithmic value of the 
ratio between the acquiring firm’s market capitalization and deal value. Market cap is the logarithmic market capitalization of the 
acquiring firm. Normal standard errors are used. Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted with *, ** and *** 
respectively. 
Dependent variable : CAR (-1, +1) Model (8) 
  
Model (9) 
 
 
β t-value 
 
β t-value 
Intercept 0.0720** 2,62 
 
0.0777*** 2,84 
SharesMix 0.0086 0.51 
 
-0.0185 -0.8 
Cross-border target 0.0200 1.22 
 
-0.0058 -0.26 
Cross-border target*SharesMix 
   
0.0542* 1,72 
Relative size 0.0129** 2,56 
 
0.1353*** 2,7 
Market cap -0.0021 -0.55 
 
-0.0005 -0.13 
N 108 
  
108 
 F 3.63 
  
3.55 
 R-square 0.1234 
  
0.1481 
 Adjusted R-square 0.0894 
  
0.1064 
  
The ‘SharesMix’ coefficient of Model 8 has a value of 0.0086. It is not statistically significant which 
means that we cannot reject the second null hypothesis. Hence we cannot conclude whether it has an 
effect on the cumulative abnormal returns or not. According to our regression (in which we, except 
for the payment method, include several control variables) the payment method will not have an 
effect on the short-term shareholder value. This is inconsistent with our previous t-test, where we 
only controlled for payment method.  
Another important part to interpret in these results is the interaction term added (‘Cross-border 
target*Sharesmix’) in Model 9. The interaction term gives us the effect of a foreign acquisition and the 
payment method Shares or Mix. The variable is significant at a 10% level. This means that we can 
reject the third null hypothesis, which in turn means that there is a significant difference between the 
two payment methods in cross-border acquisitions. The dummy variable ‘Cross-border target’ is not 
statistically significant, but although it is still positive and it appears that abnormal returns increase 
when the target is located in another country.  ‘Relative Size’ is statistically significant at a 5% level. 
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With a positive value of 0.0129 we can conclude that it has a positive effect on the CAR if the 
‘Relative Size’ of the deal increases. ‘Market Cap’ is not a significant variable but seems to have a 
negative impact on the CAR. Hence the CAR will decrease the larger the acquiring firm’s market 
capitalization. 
Our findings indicated that some of the previous arguments in favour of stock financed and cross-
border deals can be applied on the Swedish market. According to Moeller & Schlingemann (2005) 
the opportunity to reach new markets can be one of the reasons for cross-border acquisitions being 
more preferable in Sweden. Since it is a small country it is highly likely that the Swedish market looks 
favourable upon companies that choose to expand operations beyond the borders. It seems that the 
arguments against cross-border acquisitions such as problems with managerial integration (Campa & 
Hernando 2006) has less strength on the Swedish market. 
The reasons why the Swedish market is more enthusiastic about stock and mixed financed cross-
border deals than cash financed are hard to determine. Studies on the Canadian (Dutta, Saadi & Zhu, 
2013) markets showed the same results on a short time basis. However they also found that on long 
term basis stock financed deals then to underperform. They argue that, even though the stock 
financed deals seem to over perform in the short term, they underperform in the long term and that 
could be the reason why most companies still choose to use cash as payment method. Since we do 
not control for long term performance it is hard to say whether this is true for the Swedish market or 
not. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we study the short term shareholder value for firms that announce an acquisition. 
Shareholder value is defined as return on the stock and we test if the abnormal returns around the 
announcement day differ depending on whether cash or stock is used as the method of payment. In 
our analysis we also include other variables such as the home country of the target firm and the size 
of the acquisitions. Our sample is exclusively from the Swedish market and we found 108 deals that 
have taken place between 2010 and 2012. Computing and comparing cumulative abnormal returns 
we find that acquisitions do have a significantly positive effect on shareholder value at the acquiring 
firm. When we only control for payment method we find a difference in favor of stock financing. 
However, when we control for the deal-specific variables using a regression model we find no 
support for the same statement. Furthermore, the study supports our initial hypothesis that using 
stock as a means of payment in cross-border acquisitions increases short term shareholder value 
more than using pure cash. Our results are backed by analyzing differences and also by regressing the 
variables against the cumulative abnormal return. Here we find significant dependence in the 
interaction term between being a cross-border acquisition and payment being comprised of at least 
partially stock. We also find that the cumulative abnormal returns increase when the relative size of 
the deal gets bigger. 
Due to a relatively small sample we cannot test whether it is the mixture of cash and stock or the 
deals using pure stock that have the greatest effect on short term shareholder value, however we can 
conclude that the comprising the payment of acquisition at least partially of stock will increase the 
returns of the bidding firm. There could be many different reasons for this, such as a low home 
country bias in Sweden or specific characteristics of the market, and we would need to expand the 
study to find support for specific explanations. We exhort others to further investigate possible 
reasons for our findings. 
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7. Appendix 
 
7.1 Histograms for logarithmic variables 
 
 
Figure 4 
A histogram showing the distribution of observed values of the acquiring firm’s market capitalization. The leftmost shows the actual 
values and the rightmost shows the logged values. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
A histogram showing the distribution of observed values of the acquiring firm’s relative size (deal value divided by market 
capitalization). The leftmost shows the actual values (ratio) and the rightmost shows the logged values. 
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7.2 Regression for all event windows 
 
 
Table 5 
The effect of deal specific characteristics on cumulative abnormal returns. An OLS-regression is used to obtain the results. ‘SharesMix’ 
is a dummy variable for payment method. If the payment method is shares or mix the value is 1 and otherwise 0. ‘Foreign target’ is also a 
dummy variable for whether the target firm is domestic or cross-border. ‘Relative size ‘is the logarithmic value of the ratio between the 
acquiring firm’s market capitalization and deal value. ‘Market cap’ is the logarithmic market capitalization of the acquiring firm. 
Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted with *, ** and *** respectively. 
Event Windows (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (0, +2) (-5, +5) 
 
β t-value β t-value β t-value β t-value 
Intercept 0.072 2,62** 0.0776 2,56** 0.0783 2,42** 0.0864 2,2** 
SharesMix 0.0086 0.51 0.0087 0.47 0.02 1 -0.0069 -0.28 
Foreign target 0.02 1.22 0.0169 0.94 0.0265 1.38 0.0071 0.3 
Relative size 0.0129 2,56** 0.0131 2,36** 0.0116 1,96* 0.018 2,5** 
Market cap -0.002 -0.55 -0.002 -0.48 -0.004 -0.97 -0.0002 -0.03 
N 108 
 
108 
 
108 
 
108 
 F 3.63 
 
3.01 
 
3.55 
 
2.25 
 R-square 0.1234 
 
0.1048 
 
0.121 
 
0.0804 
 Adjusted R-square 0.0894 
 
0.0855 
 
0.087 
 
0.0447 
 
 
7.3 Regression for all event windows with robust standard errors 
 
 
Table 6 
Regressions with robust standard errors. Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted with *, ** and *** respectively 
Event Windows (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (0, +2) (-5, +5) 
 
β t-value β t-value β t-value β t-value 
Intercept 0,0720** 2,55 0,0776** 2,51 0,7833** 2,34 0,0864* 1,92 
SharesMix 0,0086 0,51 0,0087 0,47 0,0200 1,01 -0,0069 -0,32 
Foreign target 0,0020 1,01 0,0169 0,73 0,0266 1,07 0,0071 0,23 
Relative size 0,1290** 2,38 0,0131** 2,43 0,0116** 2,12 0,0180** 2,62 
Market cap -0,0021 -0,52 -0,0020 -0,44 -0,0043 -0,86 -0,0058 -0,03 
N 108  108  108  108  
F 2,20  2,20  2,26  2,49 
 R-square 1,1234  0,1048  0,1210  0,0804 
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7.4 Correlation matrix for variables used in regression 
 
 
Table 7 
Correlation matrix for variables used in regressions. 
 
Shares&Mix Cash Foreign 
Shares&Mix* 
Foreign Relative Size 
Market 
Capitalization 
Shares&Mix 1 
     
Cash -1 1 
    
Foreign -0,189 0,189 1 
   
Shares&Mix*Foreign 0,5641 -0,5641 0,4264 1 
  
Relative Size 0,4258 -0,4258 -0,2193 0,1877 1 
 
Market Capitalization -0,3515 0,3515 0,3952 -0,1424 -0,5567 1 
 
 
